PHILIPPINE MILITARY HISTORY: THE 1981 BLOODBATH AT PATA ISLAND…

A lot has been said of what happened to the “SAF44” together with all the uproar and overwhelming attention its getting within and outside the country… This dark event in our country’s history “benefited” much from social networking, so its easy for many people to ask for blood in retaliation… But this event pales when compared to one similar incident, the massacre of Army Troopers at Pata Island in 1981…

The 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division had launched an operation in Pata Island on 09 February 1981 in the wake of reported landings of an undetermined number of MNLF forces somewhere at Barangay Pata Likud… The 31st Infantry Battalion was at the forefront while two other battalions were screening on the mainland side… The Brigade set up its Advance Command Post in Patian Island, the next island away from Pata. As a result, Mayor Burahan of Pata called a meeting of island leaders in Barangay Saimbangon on 10 February, among the leaders was who attended was the Civil Home Defense Front (CHDF) Commander Unad Masillam of Pata Likud, and denied the presence of MNLF elements in their barangays… Assured that no MNLF forces had landed, the 31st IB began to pull out on 12 February, leaving only the Headquarters Service Company of the Battalion Commander LTC Jacinto Sardual who planned to call on Commander Unad Masillam prior to departing the area… When Sardual arrived to call on Unad before leaving with the rest of his battalion, he was accompanied by just a few men… Unad and his group accompanied LTC Sardual back to where the Headquarters Service Company was encamped…

Unad then told Sardual to have the company formed and their arms stacked so they could shake hands and bid each other farewell… While the company stood in formation, their arms neatly stacked, over 400 armed men of Unad and his allies quietly ringed them and then let loose searing volleys of automatic fire… With comrades shredded and falling like bowling pins around them, soldiers attempted to get to their stacked firearms, to no avail… Only the few that did not join the formation were able to return effective fire, but they were badly outnumbered and the outcome was inevitable… When the smoked cleared and the guns fell silent, 119 officers and men lay lifeless; Sardual’s body sprawled among those of his men… The headquarters service company of 31st IB had ceased to exist in a matter of minutes, some bodies were mutilated and burned… They had been looted of uniforms, shoes, wallets, watches and other valuables and over 120 firearms and over a million rounds of assorted ammunition fell into Unad’s hands… The Pata massacre was classic execution of one of Misuaris’s stratagem – for certain MNLF elements to join the government and at a given opportunity, to sabotage the returnee program of the government from within… Later, Commander Unad and his son slipped away from the island and their reward for what they had done: important positions in the military hierarchy of the Misuari faction… The Navy and Air Force retaliated by shelling the island for almost two months, an estimated several hundreds to 3,000 civilians were reportedly killed…

A case was filed in court against Commander Unad Masillam and 298 companions, 200 of them simply “John Does”. Pata was a bitter pill to swallow for the AFP… But as in most cases, bitter pills often brought swifter cures, for the AFP, the stigma of Pata was a priceless source of valuable lessons and it learned fast… The following are among the “lessons learned”:

– Taking note that the MNLF had given instructions to some of its units to surrender to the government and given the opportunity, to sabotage the returnee program from within. Any dealings with returnees deserve more than the usual amount of wariness and care. While the majority of returnee units sincerely came out to join the government, some measures were devised to determine which units may have come out with MNLF leadership blessings and, of course, the motive.

– Ensure that battalion commanders are competent officers seasoned with the indispensable experience of command and operations. They must have gone through the mill

– preferably starting out as platoon leaders, moving up to company command so their experience in operations and in the handling of men would show in their performance as battalion commanders. As it was, LTC Jacinto V. Sardual, CO of the 31st IB was a dental officer and did not have the benefit of regular troop leading experience before he became a battalion commander. His fatal error of ordering his men into formation and to stack up their arms allegedly on the mere suggestion of Commander Unad simply to facilitate a farewell handshake woefully showed his inadequacy.

– To always have an effective withdrawal plan for troops, ensuring that no unit, however small, is unnecessarily endangered. As it was, Commander Unad was able to assemble an armed group three times the strength of the 31st IB remaining on the island.

– When arranging for the surrender of enemy units, to have the surrender site under AFP control with superiority of forces in the site.
THE CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH HAS BEEN HAPPENING SINCE THE EARLY 1970s AND THOUSANDS HAVE DIED SINCE THEN AND MORE WILL DIE IF THIS IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE… WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SO CALLED SAF 44 AND THE “PATA 119” IS UNFORGIVABLE AND JUSTICE FOR THEM SHOULD BE PURSUED, BUT IT SHOULD BE DONE AT A LEVEL FOR PEACE TO BE WORKED IN… THE TIME HAS COME TO END THE BLOODSHED AND THIS SEEMINGLY UNENDING VICIOUS CYCLE OF HATE AND VENGEANCE… PEACE MUST BE GIVEN A CHANCE AND IT MUST BE DONE NOW AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S EFFORT IN ENDING IT WILL GO A LONG WAY…

(Reference: https://web.archive.org/web/20160304052933/http://www.army.mil.ph/Pata/default.htm